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481 
“A NUANCED APPROACH”: HOW WASHINGTON 
COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE 
Kaleigh Powell* 
Abstract: As of 2015, the vast majority of the American public had some form of health 
insurance, mostly provided by private companies. While some customers might, at some 
point, contemplate suing their insurance provider—for breach of contract, consumer 
protection statute violation, or some other cause—these potential plaintiffs are not likely to 
get far in many cases. The reason is the little-known “filed rate doctrine,” a court-created rule 
that bars lawsuits against many agency-regulated entities. The filed rate doctrine is based on 
the fact that many states, including Washington, require health insurers to file their rates with 
a regulatory agency—and have those rates approved—before they can start charging 
customers. Because companies get their rates approved by these regulatory agencies, courts 
invoke the filed rate doctrine to prevent plaintiffs from bringing actions that seek to 
“challenge” these agency-approved rates. Some courts, however, have stretched the filed rate 
doctrine too far, relying on the doctrine to dismiss breach of contract and state consumer 
protection act claims that do not challenge the actual rate paid. 
In a recent Washington case, the Washington State Supreme Court left open the question 
of whether it would broadly construe the filed rate doctrine and adopt a rule that applies the 
doctrine to cases that are only tangentially related to agency-approved rates. This Comment 
seeks to address this gap in the Washington case law and argues that Washington courts 
should not apply the filed rate doctrine to cases involving health insurers where the plaintiffs 
do not allege that their rates are too high. First, this Comment describes the current health 
insurance regulatory framework in Washington, Oregon, and California and the application 
of the filed rate doctrine in those states. It then argues why, in Washington in particular, 
courts should use—as the Washington Court of Appeals recently described it—a “nuanced 
approach” in their application of the filed rate doctrine, not using it to bar breach of contract 
or Washington Consumer Protection Act claims, but keeping it to its original purpose: to 
prevent lawsuits that seek to challenge the actual rate paid. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, about ninety-one percent of the United States population had 
some form of health insurance.1 While at some point many of these 
millions of customers might have a cause of action to sue their health 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Washington School of Law. Special thanks to Jason T. 
Dennett, who not only gave the assignment that led to this Comment, but also provided substantial 
and helpful feedback on early drafts. The author only hopes to have done credit to Mr. Dennett’s 
mentorship.  
1. Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, 
http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?currentTimeframe=0 [https://perma.cc/R6JD-
RBN4]. 
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insurance provider, most are probably unaware of the court-made rule 
that will prevent many of their lawsuits: the “filed rate doctrine.” Where 
regulated entities—like insurance providers and utility companies—file 
their rates and get them approved by a regulating agency, courts invoke 
the filed rate doctrine to dismiss lawsuits that challenge the 
reasonableness of those rates.2 The doctrine essentially holds that a 
“filed rate” is “per se reasonable and cannot be the subject of legal 
action against the private entity that filed it.”3 
The United States Supreme Court first established the filed rate 
doctrine in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co.4 It is now 
generally accepted that the “[t]he purposes of the ‘filed rate’ doctrine are 
twofold: (1) to preserve the agency’s primary jurisdiction to determine 
the reasonableness of rates, and (2) to insure that regulated entities 
charge only those rates approved by the agency.”5 That is, the purpose of 
the doctrine is to preserve the ability of the agency to carry out its 
legislatively-designed function of approving rates and to prevent 
discrimination among customers in the rates charged.6 These two 
purposes are often referred to as the “non-justiciability” strand and the 
“anti-discrimination” strand of the doctrine, respectively.7 In cases that 
would seek to undermine the ability of the agency to determine rates 
(what some courts call a typical “justiciability” case), “the court is asked 
to determine a lower rate by assessing how much defendants have 
inflated the rate through their alleged wrongdoing.”8 Courts refer to the 
doctrine as the “filed rate” and “filed tariff” doctrine interchangeably.9 
The filed rate doctrine, of course, has its critics.10 Scholars have 
argued that the doctrine should be presumptively inapplicable unless the 
regulating entity can show that its approval of the filed rate was not 
                                                     
2. Tenore v. AT&T Wireless, 136 Wash. 2d 322, 332, 962 P.2d 104, 108 (1998). 
3. Id. at 331, 962 P.2d at 108 (citing Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 27 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 
1994)). 
4. 260 U.S. 156 (1922). 
5. McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, 182 Wash. 2d 936, 942, 347 P.3d 872, 875 (2015) (quoting 
Tenore, 136 Wash. 2d at 331–32, 962 P.2d at 108). 
6. Id. 
7. Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 806 F. Supp. 1112, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d 27 F.3d 17 
(2d Cir. 1992). 
8. Id. (citing Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409 (1986)). 
9. Vonda Mallicoat Laughlin, The Filed Rate Doctrine and the Insurance Arena, 18 CONN. INS. 
L.J. 373, 375 (2012); see also AT&T Co. v. Central Office Tel., 524 U.S. 214 (1998) (using the 
terms interchangeably throughout). 
10. In re Title Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 847 (N.D. Ohio 2010).  
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arbitrary11 or that the doctrine simply should not apply at all because it 
undermines the ability of regulators and courts to promote competition 
and deter market abuses.12 But so far Washington courts, at least, have 
not taken up the call to eliminate or modify the filed rate doctrine 
pursuant to critical responses. 
Though courts first applied the doctrine to suits sounding in 
antitrust,13 many courts now apply the filed rate doctrine to cases 
involving breach of contract and state consumer protection acts.14 Courts 
reason that permitting a plaintiff to recover damages from defendants 
who have their rates approved by regulatory agencies would, in effect, 
amount to a challenge to the rates themselves.15 This Comment argues 
that such an extension of the filed rate doctrine—specifically into breach 
of contract and state consumer protection act claims in the health 
insurance arena—is both contrary to the doctrine’s core justifications 
and an unjustifiable burden on citizens who should otherwise have the 
right to bring suit against these regulated entities. 
This Comment proceeds in six Parts. Part I describes the emergence 
of the filed rate doctrine and its repeated validation in the federal context 
by the Supreme Court of the United States, explaining in detail the 
Court’s development of the non-discrimination and the non-justiciability 
strands of the doctrine. Part II focuses on the application of the federal 
filed rate doctrine in federal courts; it describes how, though courts 
purport to permit breach of contract claims involving a filed rate, courts 
around the country still use the doctrine to effectively bar these claims in 
practice by preventing any meaningful measure of damages. The filed 
rate doctrine, however, was created by a federal court to apply to claims 
related to federal regulation, so states are not required to apply the 
doctrine to cases where state regulators determine reasonable rates16—
though many do.17 Part III addresses state application of state versions of 
the filed rate doctrine; specifically, Part III describes the health 
                                                     
11. Julia Gorodetsky, Analogy by Necessity: The Filed Rate Doctrine and Judicial Review of 
Agency Inaction, 23 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2–3 (2009).  
12. Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a Deregulatory Era, 56 
VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1597 (2003). 
13. Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 159–60 (1922). 
14. See Part II, infra. 
15. See, e.g., Hoffmann v. N. States Power Co., 764 N.W.2d 34, 38 (Minn. 2009) (alleging breach 
of contract). 
16. See Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 806 F. Supp. 1112, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), aff’d 27 
F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1994). 
17. See, e.g., McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, 182 Wash. 2d 936, 943–44, 347 P.3d 872, 876 
(2015) (applying the filed rate doctrine to bar plaintiffs’ claims). 
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insurance regulatory framework and the application of the filed rate 
doctrine in Washington, Oregon, and California, drawing on federal 
precedent from Part II. This Comment focuses on these states in 
particular because of the way that—despite the proximity of each—they 
apply the doctrine very differently, if at all. Although this Comment 
focuses on the application of the filed rate doctrine in the health 
insurance arena in particular, each of these Parts relies on the application 
of the doctrine to regulated utilities as a way of explaining how the 
doctrine functions generally. Finally, Part IV concludes by laying out the 
reasons that Washington courts should not apply the filed rate doctrine 
to bar claims for breach of contract or violation of the Washington 
Consumer Protection Act (WCPA), but instead should apply a “nuanced 
approach” that determines whether the claims are only tangentially 
related to the rates paid.18 
I. THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE EMERGES OUT OF CASES 
CHALLENGING THE RATES CUSTOMERS PAID 
A. Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. Establishes the 
Filed Rate Doctrine 
Keogh is generally credited as the case that established the filed rate 
doctrine as a court-made rule, though the Supreme Court in that case 
never used the term “filed rate.”19 In that case, Keogh brought antitrust 
claims against eight railroad companies and twelve individuals, alleging 
that the defendants conspired to set freight rates and eliminate 
competition between their various companies.20 The question before the 
Supreme Court was whether Keogh could sustain a private right of 
action under Section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act for the defendants’ alleged 
conduct.21 
The defendants noted that they had filed their rates with the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC),22 which had then, upon Keogh’s 
                                                     
18. See McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, 182 Wash. App. 1, 14, 328 P.3d 940, 947 (2014), rev’d 
182 Wash. 2d 936, 944, 347 P.3d 872, 876 (2015). 
19. Allan Kanner, The Filed Rate Doctrine and Insurance Fraud Litigation, 76 N.D. L. REV. 1, 2 
n.2 (2000). 
20. Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 159–60 (1922). 
21. Id. at 161.  
22. The ICC was an agency created by Congress to “regulate construction, operation, and 
abandonment of railroad lines.” Greg H. Hirakawa, Comment, Preserving Transportation Corridors 
for the Future: Another Look at Railroad Deeds in Washington State, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 481, 
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complaint, suspended the use of the increased rates until the ICC could 
conduct hearings.23 Keogh himself participated in the hearings, but the 
ICC ultimately approved the rates over his objection.24 Keogh then sued, 
claiming as damages the “difference in rates” between what he was 
paying under the prior rate schedule and what he was forced to pay as a 
result of the ICC approval.25 He also claimed damages in the lost value 
of one of his factories as the result of lost profits from the increased 
freight rates.26 
The Supreme Court rejected Keogh’s claims for several reasons,27 
noting at the outset of its analysis that “[a]ll the rates fixed were 
reasonable and non-discriminatory. That was settled by the proceedings 
before the Commission.”28 
In rejecting Keogh’s claims, the Court first determined that neither 
Keogh nor any private plaintiff could, by definition, state a claim under 
Section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act because no plaintiff could meet the 
injury requirement under the statute.29 The Court described the injury 
requirement as follows: 
Section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act gives a right of action to one 
who has been “injured in his business or property.” Injury 
implies violation of a legal right. The legal rights of shipper as 
against carrier in respect to a rate are measured by the published 
tariff. Unless and until suspended or set aside, this rate is made, 
for all purposes, the legal rate, as between carrier and shipper. 
The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or enlarged 
by either contract or tort of the carrier.30 
Because a plaintiff could not claim violation of any legal right, there 
was no way for Keogh or any other plaintiff to meet the statute’s injury 
requirement. 
Perhaps more importantly for future filed rate cases, the Court 
reasoned that courts must apply this “stringent rule” “because otherwise 
the paramount purpose of Congress—prevention of unjust 
                                                     
486 (2001). The ICC was abolished in 1995 and replaced with the Surface Transportation 
Board. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Surface Trans. Bd., 162 F.3d 101, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1998).  
23. Keogh, 260 U.S. at 160.  
24. Id.  
25. Id.  
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 162. 
28. Id. at 161. 
29. Id. at 162.  
30. Id. at 163. 
17 - Powell.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2017  3:25 PM 
486 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:481 
 
discrimination—might be defeated.”31 In other words, if courts 
permitted a private plaintiff to recover for damages resulting from 
artificially high rates, then that plaintiff would, in effect, pay a different 
rate than that plaintiff’s non-suing counterpart.32 Keogh argued that a 
discriminatory rate would not necessarily ensue from permitting a cause 
of action under Section 7 because any person might bring suit and obtain 
the benefit of a reduced rate.33 The Court rejected that argument, though, 
noting that “[u]niform treatment would not result, even if all sued, unless 
the highly improbable happened, and the several juries and courts gave 
to each the same measure of relief.”34 
According to the Court, Keogh also had a causation problem: he, like 
other plaintiffs attempting to bring suit under Section 7, would not only 
have to prove that he would have paid a lower rate in the absence of a 
conspiracy, he would also have to prove that this “hypothetical lower 
rate” would have been lawful under the Act to Regulate Commerce and 
would have been approved by the ICC.35 The Court refused to submit 
that question—whether Keogh’s hypothetical rates would be 
discriminatory under the Act—to the ICC. “[B]y no conceivable 
proceeding could the question whether a hypothetical lower rate would 
under conceivable conditions have been discriminatory, be submitted to 
the Commission for determination.”36 That point, like the others already 
addressed by the Court, proved fatal to Keogh’s claim because that 
“hypothetical question [was] one with which plaintiff would necessarily 
be confronted at trial” and was one that the Court determined Keogh 
would be unable to prove there.37 
Finally, the Court determined that Keogh could not bring his antitrust 
action challenging the approved rates because the damages he alleged 
were “purely speculative.”38 Specifically, the Court determined that no 
court or jury would be able to say that the benefit of lower rates would 
                                                     
31. Id.  
32. Id. (“If a shipper could recover under § 7 of the Anti-Trust Act for damages resulting from the 
exaction of a rate higher than that which would otherwise have prevailed, the amount recovered 
might, like a rebate, operate to give him a preference over his trade competitors.”).  
33. Id.  
34. Id.  
35. Id. at 163–64. 
36. Id. at 164. 
37. Id.  
38. Id.  
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flow directly to Keogh—“[t]he benefit might have gone to his 
customers, or conceivably, to the ultimate consumer.”39 
Thus, without using the term “filed rate doctrine,” the Court created a 
rule that would, as it was elaborated and expanded, eventually bar many 
suits against entities with agency-approved rates. 
B. The Supreme Court Elaborates on the “Non-Justiciability” Strand 
of Filed Rate and Applies It to State Law Actions that Implicate 
Federally-Filed Rates 
Several decades after Keogh, the Court continued protecting agency-
approved rates from collateral attack in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. 
Northwestern Public Service Co.40 and Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. 
Hall.41 Together these cases illustrate what has come to be known as the 
“non-justiciability” strand of the filed rate doctrine: the idea that courts 
are not equipped to make a decision on what rates would be 
“reasonable” because Congress has delegated that decision to the 
agency. 
In Montana-Dakota, the plaintiff, Montana-Dakota Utilities 
Company, alleged that it was being charged “unreasonably high prices” 
for the defendant’s electricity.42 Though the rates that the plaintiff paid 
were approved by the Federal Power Commission pursuant to the 
Federal Power Act, the plaintiff alleged that it had been unable to 
“protest to the Commission to have reasonable rates and charges 
established” because, at the time the rates were set, the plaintiff 
company and defendant company shared a board of directors—
preventing the plaintiff company from challenging the rates set.43 The 
Court ruled, however, that Congress had delegated the authority to 
determine reasonable rates to the agency, so courts had no place in 
determining what a “reasonable” rate might be: 
Statutory reasonableness is an abstract quality represented by an 
area rather than a pinpoint. It allows a substantial spread 
between what is unreasonable because too low and what is 
unreasonable because too high. To reduce the abstract concept 
                                                     
39. Id. at 165.  
40. 341 U.S. 246 (1950). 
41. 453 U.S. 571 (1981).  
42. Montana-Dakota, 341 U.S. at 248. 
43. Id. 
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of reasonableness to concrete expression in dollars and cents is 
the function of the Commission.44 
The plaintiff, therefore, could not state a cause of action under the 
Federal Power Act for unreasonable rates.45 Rather, the only rate that the 
plaintiff had a right to was the rate set by the Commission—“the courts 
can assume no right to a different [rate] on the ground that, in its 
opinion, it is the only or the more reasonable one.”46 
This concept reappeared years later in Arkansas Louisiana Gas, 
where the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether 
the filed rate doctrine “forbids a state court to calculate damages in a 
breach-of-contract action based on an assumption that had a higher rate 
been filed, the Commission would have approved it.”47 In Arkansas 
Louisiana Gas, the plaintiffs were producers of natural gas who entered 
into a contract with the defendant, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company 
(Arkla) under which the plaintiffs would sell their gas to the defendant.48 
The contract had a fixed price, but it also included a “favored nations” 
clause that provided that the plaintiffs would be paid more for their sales 
to Arkla if Arkla purchased gas from another party at a rate higher than 
what it was paying the plaintiffs.49 The plaintiffs filed both the contract 
and their rates with the Federal Power Commission and “obtained from 
the Commission a certificate authorizing the sale of gas at the rates 
specified in the contract.”50 
Years later, Arkla purchased leases from the United States and started 
producing gas on the leaseholds.51 The plaintiffs eventually filed a state 
court action complaining that the lease payments had triggered the 
favored nations provision and sought “as damages an amount equal to 
the difference between the price they actually were paid in the 
intervening years and the price they would have paid had the favored 
nations clause gone into effect.”52 
As it had in Montana-Dakota, the Court determined that the 
plaintiff’s requested relief—reasonable rates that the defendant would 
have paid another party—was a nonjusticiable issue; that is, under the 
                                                     
44. Id. at 251. 
45. Id. at 251–52.  
46. Id. at 252. 
47. Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 573 (1981) (emphasis added). 
48. Id.  
49. Id.  
50. Id. at 574. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
17 - Powell.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2017  3:25 PM 
2017] “A NUANCED APPROACH” 489 
 
Natural Gas Act, “the rates that a regulated gas company files with the 
Commission for the sale and transportation of natural gas are lawful only 
if they are ‘just and reasonable,’” and “[n]o court may substitute its own 
judgment on reasonableness for the judgment of the Commission.”53 
“The authority to decide whether the rates are reasonable is vested by 
§ 4 of the Act solely in the Commission.”54 
In Montana-Dakota and Arkansas Louisiana, then, the Court 
emphasized that one of the key purposes of the filed rate doctrine is to 
prevent judicial interference in decisions delegated to regulating 
agencies, especially because a court is ill-equipped to make policy 
decisions about “reasonable” rates. 
C. The Supreme Court Reaffirms Keogh in Square D 
The Supreme Court was given the chance to overrule Keogh—and the 
filed rate doctrine as a whole—in Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier 
Tariff Bureau.55 In that case, various shipping companies brought a 
private action against defendant motor carriers for antitrust in violation 
of the Sherman Act. The question presented was whether the carriers 
could be subject to treble damages if the shipping companies proved the 
allegations in their complaint.56 The Court conducted its analysis in three 
parts, considering: (1) the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint; 
(2) the impact of Keogh on the case at hand; and (3) “the extent to which 
the rule of the Keogh case remains part of our law today.”57 The 
discussion here focuses only on the last two parts, which relate to the 
filed rate doctrine. 
The Court quickly handled the question of Keogh’s application, 
finding that the rates in Square D, like those in Keogh, were duly 
submitted to and deemed lawful by the ICC.58 The question for the 
Court, then, was “whether [it] should continue to respect the rule of 
Keogh,”59 especially in light of the fact that the petitioners and the 
Solicitor General were asking the Court to overrule Keogh.60 The Court 
identified a number of historical changes that might undermine its ruling 
                                                     
53. Id. at 577. 
54. Id.  
55. 476 U.S. 409 (1986). 
56. Id. at 410.  
57. Id. at 411.  
58. Id. at 417. 
59. Id.  
60. Id.  
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in Keogh, including: the development of class actions, which could 
address the concern of “discriminatory” rates that arise where one 
customer receives a damages award and another does not; “the 
emergence of precedents permitting treble-damages remedies even when 
there is a regulatory remedy available”; innovation in calculating 
damages, which might address the fear that damages calculations might 
otherwise be “speculative”; and, finally, the “development of procedures 
in which judicial proceedings can be stayed pending regulatory 
proceedings.”61 
Ultimately, though, the Court rejected out of hand the argument that 
these “developments” should cause it to overrule Keogh, concluding that 
they were “insufficient to overcome the strong presumption of continued 
validity that adheres in the judicial interpretation of a statute.”62 
II. FILED RATE CASES INVOLVING BREACH OF CONTRACT 
ARE GENERALLY PERMITTED, BUT THE DOCTRINE STILL 
PREVENTS MOST MEASURES OF DAMAGES IN FEDERAL 
COURTS 
Most federal courts permit a breach of contract claim even where a 
filed rate is involved. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has ruled that the 
Federal Power Act preempts breach of contract claims that challenge a 
filed rate, but not breach of contract claims based on another rationale.63 
One such rationale was adequately asserted, according to the Fifth 
Circuit, in Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Alabama Power Co.,64 which “held 
that . . . there is no preemption if damages were sought because the 
breach [of contract] caused an increase in the quantity [of electricity] 
purchased at the filed rate,” rather than an increase in the filed rate 
itself.65 Similarly, in Euclid Insurance Agencies, Inc. v. Scottsdale 
Insurance Co.,66 the filed rate doctrine did not bar the plaintiff’s claim 
for breach of contract because, the court reasoned, the plaintiffs had 
challenged the defendant’s failure “to honor its contractual obligation to 
                                                     
61. Id. at 423. 
62. Id. at 424. Notably, in dissent, Justice Marshall adopted the lower court opinion of the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which, in his view, “cogently and comprehensively explained why the 
reasoning of [Keogh] has been rendered obsolete by subsequent developments in the law.” Id. at 
424–25 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
63. Mirant Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 378 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2006). 
64. 824 F.2d 1465 (5th Cir. 1987). 
65. Mirant, 378 F.3d at 519.  
66. No. 95 C 3308, 1998 WL 60775, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 1998). 
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adjust rates” rather than the reasonableness of the rates themselves.67 
Thus, federal courts have contemplated at least some scenarios where 
the filed rate doctrine does not bar lawsuits that do not challenge the 
reasonableness of the rates themselves. But while these claims are 
purportedly allowed, federal courts may still dismiss these claims if the 
plaintiffs’ proposed measure of damages would require a court to engage 
in the same sort of reasonable rate inquiry that the legislature delegated 
to the agency. 
A. Courts Dismiss Filed Rate Claims if Resolution of Those Claims 
Would Require a Court to Calculate a Reasonable Rate 
It appears that where plaintiffs challenge some part of a defendant’s 
conduct, and not the reasonableness of the rate the defendant charged the 
plaintiffs, courts still dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under the filed rate 
doctrine if the plaintiffs’ damages request would require some sort of 
rate calculation. As the Eighth Circuit ruled, “the underlying conduct 
does not control whether the filed rate doctrine applies. Rather, the focus 
for determining whether the filed rate doctrine applies is the impact the 
court’s decision will have on agency procedures and rate 
determinations.”68 In other words, according to some courts, the “filed 
rate doctrine prohibits a party from recovering damages measured by 
comparing the filed rate and the rate that might have been approved 
absent the conduct at issue.”69 
The Ninth Circuit has expressly adopted the principle that the filed 
rate doctrine bars claims for damages that require reference to the filed 
rate.70 In NOS Communications,71 the Ninth Circuit considered claims in 
a multidistrict litigation from various plaintiffs asserting, inter alia, fraud 
and consumer protection against defendant telecommunications 
carriers.72 The court, in affirming and reversing dismissal on the various 
                                                     
67. Id. (“Although the reasonableness of [defendant’s] insurance rates and the fact that the rates 
were governed by regulatory agencies may be factors in deciding this issue, they are not 
dispositive.”). See also Randleman v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 2d 812, 823 (N.D. 
Ohio 2006) (“The filed rate doctrine is inapplicable in this action. Plaintiffs are not challenging the 
reasonableness of the filed rate, but instead attempt to enforce a contract incorporating a filed 
rate.”).  
68. H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 954 F.2d 485, 489 (8th Cir. 1992). 
69. Id. at 488; see also Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp., 806 F. Supp. 1112, 1121–22 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992), aff’d 27 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1992).  
70. See In re NOS Comms. 495 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). 
71. 495 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007). 
72. Id. at 1057. 
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claims under the filed rate doctrine, held that in filed rate cases, “where 
the measure of damages requires comparing the rates charged under the 
filed-rate with the rate that allegedly should have been charged, . . . state 
claims are preempted.”73 Plaintiffs’ claims, therefore, were only 
permissible “to the extent that [they] . . . assert claims that neither attack 
the rates nor require reference to the filed-rate for a calculation of 
damages.”74 
B. Federal Courts Dismiss Cases Under Filed Rate Even Where 
Plaintiffs Allege Nonperformance of Contractual Obligations 
There is at least one federal case where plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants failed to perform contractual obligations but the court ruled 
that the filed rate doctrine still barred their claims. In Rios v. State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Co.,75 the plaintiff class alleged state law claims for 
fraudulent inducement/rescission, unjust enrichment, and breach of 
contract. They sought premium damages paid to State Farm Insurance 
for an Upfront Endorsement Policy that State Farm ceased to honor. 
State Farm moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the filed 
rate doctrine barred plaintiffs from recovering premium damages.76 
Plaintiffs countered that “the return of the Upfront Endorsement 
premiums, as damages, do not implicate the filed rate doctrine because 
[the plaintiffs were] not ‘contesting the amount of premium set by state 
regulators, the reasonableness of any rate or premium approval by any 
state or federal regulatory agency or insurance department,’” and 
because, significantly, the plaintiffs did “not request anything that would 
require the court to re-calculate the premium rate approved by any state 
or federal regulatory agency or insurance department.”77 Rather, 
                                                     
73. Id. at 1060.  
74. Id. (emphasis added). A notable exception is Ellsworth v. U.S. Bank, 908 F. Supp. 2d 1063 
(N.D. Cal. 2012), where the plaintiff brought a putative class action challenging the defendant U.S. 
Bank’s practice of force-placing flood insurance on his real property in return for a kickback from 
defendant insurance company. U.S. Bank argued that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the filed 
rate doctrine. Id. at 1082. The court held that the doctrine did not apply, reasoning that “[j]ust 
because the damages are based on increased costs incurred as a result of the alleged kickback 
scheme does not transform a challenge to conduct and practices into a challenge to the premiums.” 
Id. at 1083. See also Gallo v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 916 F. Supp. 2d 537, 548 (D.N.J. 2012) (holding 
that plaintiff’s claim could proceed, despite filed rate doctrine, because plaintiff “clearly 
complain[ed] of Defendant PHH Mortgage’s conduct in allegedly improperly receiving various 
financial benefits through the forced-placed insurance process, and cannot be fairly read as a direct 
challenge to the reasonableness of the rates charged”). 
75. 469 F. Supp. 2d 727 (S.D. Iowa 2007). 
76. Id. at 733. 
77. Id. at 737. 
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“[p]laintiffs argue that they are merely seeking to enforce the terms of 
the services State Farm filed with the Commissioner, which would not 
conflict with the filed rate doctrine.”78 
The court, relying on H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,79 
disagreed and held that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the filed 
rate doctrine because “for all practical purposes, the damages sought can 
only be measured by comparing the difference between the premium 
rates the Commissioner originally approved with the premium rates the 
Commissioner should have approved.”80 Specifically, the court found 
that to measure the damages in Rios, it would have to determine what 
portion of the plaintiffs’ premiums were being used for the Upfront 
Endorsement provision and then “second guess” what rate would have 
been approved for the policies without the Upfront Endorsement 
provision; it refused to do so because it determined that “[t]his type of 
rate making and damages concept falls squarely within the filed rate 
doctrine.”81 
In Rios, then, the proposed measure of damages was a refund of the 
premium equal to the market rate for the contract provision at issue (the 
Upfront Provision), and the courts dismissed the damages claims.82 
Thus, while breach of contract claims are not per se barred under the 
filed rate doctrine, damages calculations matter a great deal. 
Specifically, courts have evinced a willingness to dismiss claims for 
                                                     
78. Id. 
79. 954 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1992). 
80. Id. at 739. 
81. Id. (emphasis original) (internal citations omitted). 
82. State courts, too, have similarly barred claims for nonperformance of contractual obligations 
in some cases. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Northern States Power Co., 764 N.W.2d 34 (Minn. 2009). In 
Hoffman, plaintiffs in a putative class action brought state law claims for breach of contract against 
their electricity provider, alleging that the provider failed to meet its contractual obligation to 
maintain the electrical wiring leading to plaintiffs’ homes. Id. at 38. The Court held that although 
the plaintiffs could pursue injunctive relief to enforce the terms of the contract, id. at 45–46, the 
filed rate doctrine precluded them from recovering compensatory damages in the amount of the 
market rate of the services not rendered, id. at 48. The Court reasoned that “appellants essentially 
claim an overcharge for services actually performed under the tariff, compared to the services 
appellants claim the tariff required to be performed. These damages are measured as the difference 
between what the appellants actually paid for the performance of the service not received and the 
presumably lesser amount they would have paid had the services not been required in the tariff.” Id. 
at 47. The Court found that the proposed damages calculation would require it to contravene the 
dual purposes of the filed rate doctrine. Id. Firstly, the plaintiff’s proposed damages calculation 
would violate the non-justiciability principle because “[t]he measure of damages in this case 
is . . . inextricably linked to the filed rate.” Id. Further, this damages calculation would violate the 
non-discrimination principle because such a damages award “would result in appellants paying less 
for the electrical services than non-class members.” Id. at 48. The filed rate doctrine, therefore, 
barred the claim. Id. 
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nonperformance of a contractual obligation under the filed rate doctrine 
where the plaintiffs seek a partial refund of their premium in damages. 
III. STATES TAKE DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO WHETHER 
AND HOW TO APPLY STATE LAW VERSIONS OF THE 
FILED RATE DOCTRINE 
Though state courts are not required to apply the filed rate doctrine 
where rates are not filed with federal government agencies, many states 
have adopted their own versions of the filed rate doctrine or at least 
considered adopting it.83 Three of those states—Washington, Oregon, 
and California—are now considered in turn; these states each approach 
the filed rate doctrine differently despite their geographic proximity. 
Washington’s application of the doctrine is uncertain—as very few cases 
have addressed the issue—but there seems to be an opening for lawsuits 
like breach of contract or state consumer protection act violations that do 
not challenge the reasonableness of rates filed.84 Oregon courts have 
never applied the filed rate doctrine in that state—despite considering 
the doctrine on at least two occasions—but have evinced a willingness to 
engage in the kinds of activities the federal filed rate doctrine generally 
seems to bar: requiring a refund of rates paid and asking regulating 
agencies to reconsider approved rates.85 Finally, California is unusual in 
that its filed rate doctrine (for most kinds of insurance) is embodied in 
statute, and its lower courts expressly disagree about whether and how 
the filed rate doctrine applies to regulated entities.86 
A. Washington Has Adopted the Filed Rate Doctrine, but the 
Parameters of Its Application Are Uncertain 
Washington courts have had little opportunity to apply the filed rate 
doctrine, as to date it has only expressly been addressed in three 
published Washington cases.87 These cases leave the parameters of the 
doctrine’s application in Washington unclear.88 This section will discuss 
the health insurance regulatory framework in Washington and filed rate 
                                                     
83. See Laughlin, supra note 9, at 392–95. 
84. See section III.A.3, infra.  
85. See sections III.B.2–3, infra.  
86. See section III.C, infra.  
87. Those three cases are McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, 182 Wash. 2d 936, 347 P.3d 872 
(2015); Tenore v. AT&T Wireless, 136 Wash. 2d 322, 962 P.2d 104 (1998); and Hardy v. Claircom 
Comms. Grp., 86 Wash. App. 488, 937 P.2d 1128 (1997). 
88. See section III.A.3, infra. 
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precedent in the state. It will then conclude with an analysis of what the 
likely continued application of the doctrine in Washington will be. 
1. The Washington Health Insurance Regulatory Framework 
In Washington, the Office of the Insurance Commissioner (OIC) 
approves health insurance premiums.89 “Among its powers, the OIC may 
disapprove (1) ambiguous or misleading contracts and deceptive 
solicitations and (2) contracts the benefits of which are ‘unreasonable in 
relation to the amount charged for the contract.’”90 The requirements for 
individual and small group filings are contained in section 284-43-6100 
of the Washington Administrative Code.91 
The OIC reviews rate increase requests only from individual and 
small employer92 plans.93 These plans make up just a small percentage 
of the overall Washington insurance market—in 2014, five percent of 
Washington residents with health insurance had individual plans, and 
four percent received their plans from small group employers.94 Almost 
half of all Washington residents with health insurance get their insurance 
through large group insurance policies.95 
The OIC regulatory process for large group rates is very different.96 
Large insurers create and file “Large Group Rating Models” with the 
OIC.97 The OIC reviews these models, requiring the insurer to respond 
                                                     
89. McCarthy, 182 Wash. 2d at 941, 347 P.3d at 875. 
90. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE §§ 48.44.020(2)–(3), 48.44.110 (2014)).  
91. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-43-6100 (2016). 
92. A small group employer is an employer with up to fifty employees. See Frequently Asked 
Questions About Health Insurance Rates, WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF THE INSURANCE COMM’R, 
https://www.insurance.wa.gov/your-insurance/health-insurance/health-rates/freqently-asked-questions/ 
[https://perma.cc/7WVP-DBVA] [hereinafter FAQ About Health Insurance Rates] (under “How we 
review rates”). 
93. See id.  
94. MIKE KREIDLER, OFFICE OF THE INS. COMM’R, THE STATE OF WASHINGTON’S UNINSURED 
2014–2015, 15 fig.4-2 (2016), https://www.insurance.wa.gov/about-oic/reports/commissioner-
reports/documents/2014-2015-state-of-uninsured.pdf [https://perma.cc/UPZ4-M3XG] [hereinafter 
WASHINGTON’S UNINSURED]. 
95. Id. The rest of Washington’s health insurance (other than individual, small group employer, 
and large group employer providers) largely comes from Medicaid (twenty-five percent of 
Washington’s insured) and Medicare (seventeen percent). Id.  
96. See FAQ About Health Insurance Rates, supra note 92 (under “How we review rates”) (“We 
also review the policies for large employer health plans (51+ employees), but most employers can 
negotiate the rates with their insurance company.” (emphasis added)).  
97. Premera, Premera Blue Cross, and Lifewise Health Plan of Washington’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 1–2, McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, No. 122015708, 2013 WL 9008317 
(Wash. Super. Jan. 4, 2013), 2012 WL 11386547. 
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to various “objections” the OIC might have.98 The insurer then directly 
negotiates its actual rates with its large group insureds.99 After the 
insurer and the large group insureds negotiate their rates, the insurer files 
its individual large group contracts with the OIC.100 The OIC is 
empowered to disapprove these large group contracts on various 
grounds, including in situations where the OIC determines that “the 
benefits provided therein are unreasonable in relation to the amount 
charged for the contract.”101 No part of the statutory scheme, however, 
requires the OIC to review and affirmatively approve those rates, and 
indeed it appears that the OIC chooses not to do so.102 
2. Washington Has Implicitly Adopted a State Version of the Filed 
Rate Doctrine That Bars Suits Alleging Artificially High Rates 
To date, there have been only three published Washington cases that 
consider the filed rate doctrine, resulting in two opinions by the 
Washington State Supreme Court and one by the Court of Appeals.103 
Though Washington courts have never explicitly stated that they are 
                                                     
98. Id.  
99. Id. (“One important difference between large group and small group or individual rates is that 
the large group rates are customized for each group after individualized negotiations between 
Premera and each individual group.”).  
100. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE § 48.44.040 (2016).  
101. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.44.020(3) (2016). The OIC may also disapprove the contracts for 
any of the reasons listed in § 48.44.020(2), which empowers the OIC to reject any individual or 
group contract:  
(a) If it contains or incorporates by reference any inconsistent, ambiguous or misleading 
clauses, or exceptions and conditions which unreasonably or deceptively affect the risk 
purported to be assumed in the general coverage of the contract; or (b) If it has any title, 
heading, or other indication of its provisions which is misleading; or (c) If purchase of health 
care services thereunder is being solicited by deceptive advertising; or (d) If it contains 
unreasonable restrictions on the treatment of patients; or (e) If it violates any provision of this 
chapter; or (f) If it fails to conform to minimum provisions or standards required by regulation 
made by the commissioner pursuant to chapter 34.05 RCW; or (g) If any contract for health 
care services with any state agency, division, subdivision, board, or commission or with any 
political subdivision, municipal corporation, or quasi-municipal corporation fails to comply 
with state law. 
102. See How We Review Health Rates, WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF THE INSURANCE 
COMM’R, https://www.insurance.wa.gov/your-insurance/health-insurance/health-rates/how-we-
review-rates/ [https://perma.cc/RXC6-6XU2] (“We review all rate requests for individual and small-
group plans (employers with 1–50 employees) in Washington state.”); Search Health Insurance 
Rate Increases, WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF THE INSURANCE COMM’R, https://www.insurance. 
wa.gov/health-rates/Search.aspx [https://perma.cc/NRB9-NWLM] (database for rate increase 
requests for individuals and small groups only).  
103. See McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, 182 Wash. App. 1, 11–12, 328 P.3d 940, 946 (2014) 
(noting that, prior to McCarthy, there were only two filed rate cases in Washington—one by the 
Washington State Supreme Court and one by the Washington Court of Appeals), rev’d 182 Wash. 
2d 936, 944, 347 P.3d 872, 876 (2015).  
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adopting the filed rate doctrine, it appears that these cases implicitly 
adopted a Washington State version.104 
The Washington State Supreme Court first considered the filed rate 
doctrine in Tenore v. AT&T Wireless.105 In that case, customers 
challenged AT&T’s nondisclosure of its practice of rounding up phone 
call durations to the next highest minute.106 AT&T argued that, under the 
filed rate doctrine, it could not be subject to the lawsuit because 
calculating the plaintiffs’ damages—the amount that the plaintiffs had 
overpaid as a result of the billing practice—would require a court to 
calculate a reasonable rate for phone service.107 As a preliminary matter, 
the Court decided that the federal filed rate doctrine did not apply 
because the defendants in that case were specifically exempted from 
filing tariffs with the FCC.108 
In dicta relevant to the filed rate doctrine, however, the Court then 
considered whether the claims were nonetheless barred on federal 
preemption grounds—specifically, the Court considered whether the 
Federal Communications Act completely preempted plaintiffs’ state law 
claims by barring “State or local government . . . authority to regulate 
the entry of or the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or 
any private mobile service.”109 The Court noted that “[t]he award of 
damages is not per se state regulation, and as the United States Supreme 
Court has observed, does not require a court to ‘substitute its judgment 
                                                     
104. See id. at 11, 328 P.3d at 946. As noted by the Washington Court of Appeals in McCarthy, 
prior to its consideration of that case, only two published Washington cases had considered the filed 
rate doctrine in Washington: Tenore and Hardy. Id. at 11–12, 328 P.3d at 946. Both of those cases, 
however, dealt with the federal version of the filed rate doctrine. See Tenore v. AT&T Wireless, 
136 Wash. 2d 322, 334, 962 P.2d 104, 109–10 (1998) (noting that whether the filed rate doctrine 
applied to that case depended on whether the defendant telecommunications companies had filed 
their rates with the Federal Communications Commission); Hardy v. Claircom Comms. Grp., 86 
Wash. App. 488, 490–91, 937 P.2d 1128, 1130–32 (1997) (noting that “[t]he filed tariff doctrine 
arises under the Federal Communications Act,” which required the telecommunications company 
defendant to file its tariffs with the FCC). The Washington Court of Appeals indicated that the 
Washington courts had at least implicitly adopted the doctrine in Washington, however, when it 
stated that “[w]hether to extend the filed rate doctrine to a claim involving health insurance is a 
question of first impression.” McCarthy, 182 Wash. App. at 11, 328 P.3d at 946. The Washington 
State Supreme Court, on review, did not consider this “question of first impression,” further 
indicating that a state version of the doctrine has been implicitly adopted. See McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. 
Premera, 182 Wash. 2d 936, 347 P.3d 872 (2015). 
105. 136 Wash. 2d 322, 962 P.2d 104 (1998). 
106. Id. at 327, 962 P.2d at 106. 
107. Id. at 328–29, 962 P.2d at 107. 
108. Id. at 334, 962 P.2d at 109–10. 
109. Id. at 328, 962 P.2d at 110. 
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for the agency’s on the reasonableness of a rate.’”110 Accordingly, the 
plaintiffs’ state law claims and the damages they sought were not 
preempted by the Federal Communications Act.111 
In Hardy v. Claircom Communications Group,112 the Washington 
Court of Appeals determined that the filed rate doctrine barred 
customers’ claims against the defendant for failing to disclose its billing 
practices. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the defendant breached its 
contract and violated the Washington Consumer Protection Act (WCPA) 
by failing to disclose that its billing practice was to round up charges 
from its air-to-ground telephones in commercial aircraft to the next 
highest minute, thereby increasing the cost of the plaintiffs’ telephone 
use.113 The plaintiffs reasoned that the filed rate doctrine should not bar 
their claims because they were “specifically challenging the allegedly 
deceptive advertising practices of [the defendants], not the underlying 
rate.”114 
The court determined that, irrespective of the plaintiffs’ claim that 
they were not challenging the reasonableness of the rates, the damages 
calculation that the court would be required to perform barred the 
plaintiffs’ actions.115 The court reasoned that it would, in other words, 
have to determine what a reasonable rate would have been as a baseline 
for assessing damages.116 The court, moreover, invoked the non-
discrimination strand of filed rate, finding that:  
[A]ny court-imposed award of damages would by definition 
result in [the plaintiffs] paying something other than the filed 
rate . . . . Significantly, neither [plaintiff] alleges that they or any 
other customer has paid anything other than the filed rate. Both 
of their claims are thus barred by the filed tariff doctrine.117 
In McCarthy Finance, Inc. v. Premera,118 the Washington State 
Supreme Court had an opportunity to consider the filed rate doctrine in 
the state regulatory context. In that case, the Court was asked to consider 
whether the filed rate doctrine barred the plaintiffs’ WCPA claims 
                                                     
110. Id. at 345, 962 P.2d at 115 (quoting Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 299 
(1976)). 
111. Id.  
112. 86 Wash. App. 488, 937 P.2d 1128 (1997).  
113. Id. at 490, 937 P.2d at 1130. 
114. Id. at 494, 937 P.2d at 1132. 
115. Id.  
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 494–95, 937 P.2d at 1132. 
118. 182 Wash. 2d 936, 347 P.3d 872 (2015). 
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against their insurance provider and the Washington Alliance for 
Healthcare Insurance Trust (WAHIT) for allegedly “collud[ing] and 
ma[king] false and misleading representations to the plaintiffs that 
induced the plaintiffs to purchase health insurance policies under false 
pretenses.”119 Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the 
defendants’ WCPA violations, the plaintiffs paid “excessive, 
unnecessary, unfair and deceptive overcharges for health insurance” 
even though their rates had been approved by the Washington OIC.120 
The Court noted at the outset that a claim for damages relating to the 
plaintiffs’ insurance premiums was not per se barred by the filed rate 
doctrine.121 Rather, it was up to courts to “determine whether the claims 
and damages are merely incidental to agency-approved rates and 
therefore may be considered by courts or would necessarily require 
courts to reevaluate agency-approved rates and therefore may not be 
considered by courts.”122 The Court stated that “[i]n most cases, courts 
must consider [WCPA] claims even when the requested damages are 
related to agency-approved rates.”123 The Court, however, qualified this 
broad command, noting that such a WCPA claim would be able to 
proceed only “to the extent that claimants can prove damages without 
attacking agency-approved rates” because it was in those cases that the 
benefits of considering the plaintiffs’ WCPA claims would outweigh any 
value in dismissing those claims under filed rate.124 
For that reason, the plaintiffs in McCarthy might have been able to 
proceed on their WCPA claim—but those plaintiffs, “rather than 
requesting general damages or seeking any damages that [did] not 
directly attack agency-approved rates,” requested refunds of the 
overpayments they allegedly made in addition to the insurance 
company’s alleged surplus.125 Specifically, the plaintiffs sought two 
forms of damages, both of which expressly asked for a refund of 
premiums paid: first, the plaintiffs requested “a refund[] of the gross and 
excessive overcharges in premium payments” that resulted from the 
defendant’s unfair business practices and excessive premiums; second, 
                                                     
119. Id. at 939, 347 P.3d at 873–74. 
120. Id. at 940, 347 P.3d at 874. 
121. Id. at 942–43, 347 P.3d at 875 (“The mere fact that a claim is related to an agency-approved 
rate is no bar.”). 
122. Id. at 942, 347 P.3d at 875 (emphasis added) (citing Tenore v. AT&T Wireless, 136 Wash. 
2d 322, 344, 962 P.2d 104, 115 (1998)).  
123. Id. at 943, 347 P.3d at 875. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 943, 347 P.3d at 875–76. 
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the plaintiffs sought a refund of the excess surplus to the insureds who 
paid the “high premiums causing the excess.”126 Because the plaintiffs 
sought damages that would necessarily require a court to calculate a 
reasonable rate for their insurance premiums, the plaintiffs’ claims were 
barred by the filed rate doctrine.127 The Court reasoned that: 
[A]warding either of the two specific damages requested by the 
Policyholders would run contrary to the purposes of the filed 
rate doctrine because the court would need to determine what 
health insurance premiums would have been reasonable for the 
Policyholders to pay as a baseline for calculating the amount of 
damages[,] and the OIC has already determined that the health 
insurance premiums paid by the Policyholders were 
reasonable.128 
3. The Future Application of the Filed Rate Doctrine in Washington 
Is Unsettled 
It is unclear from these few cases how Washington would treat a 
claim involving a filed rate against a defendant for failure to perform 
services promised in a contract. The Washington Supreme Court seems 
willing to hear claims that tangentially involve filed rates but do not 
challenge the reasonableness of those rates—especially WCPA 
claims.129 But the Washington State Supreme Court has also been 
careful to note that the damages calculations in those cases would need 
to be calculated “to the extent that claimants can prove damages without 
attacking agency-approved rates.”130 In particular, the Court barred the 
claims by the McCarthy plaintiffs on the ground that it would be 
required to determine as a baseline a reasonable rate for insurance 
premiums, which violated the non-justiciability strand of the filed rate 
doctrine.131 But the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision in 
McCarthy provided little guidance on what might constitute a claim that 
did not “attack” an agency-approved rate—a gap that this Comment 
seeks to address by considering the purposes of the filed rate doctrine.132 
                                                     
126. Id. at 940, 347 P.3d at 874. 
127. Id. at 943–44, 347 P.3d at 876. 
128. Id. at 943, 347 P.3d at 876 (emphasis added).  
129. Id. at 943, 347 P.3d at 875 (“[T]he benefits gained from courts’ considering CPA claims 
outweigh any benefit that would be derived from applying the filed rate doctrine to bar the 
claims.”). 
130. Id. (emphasis added). 
131. Id. at 943, 347 P.3d at 876.  
132. See infra Part IV.  
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It is unclear whether Washington courts would treat a claim alleging 
nonperformance of promised services differently than a claim for 
excessive premiums. But it seems, based on the decision of the court of 
appeals in Hardy, that it does not matter whether the court would be able 
to assign a reasonable value to the complained-of conduct—in that case, 
overcharging consumers by rounding up the call times—and subtract 
that from the price actually paid. That is, it seems plausible that the 
Hardy court could have calculated the damages to each individual 
caller—presuming that the defendants kept records of call times pre-
rounding—and then subtracted that total from the rate paid. The court 
declined to do so, however, following the same reasoning in McCarthy 
and holding that the damages calculation in that case would 
impermissibly require the court to engage in ratemaking. Hardy, 
however, was a case involving federally-filed rates,133 and need not 
dictate the outcome in future Washington State filed rate cases. Which 
Washington claims (and which measures of damages) might be 
dismissed under the filed rate doctrine, therefore, is uncertain. 
B. Oregon Does Not Have a State Version of the Filed Rate Doctrine 
Oregon courts, unlike Washington courts, have not applied the filed 
rate doctrine in their state.134 But Oregon has given some more 
indication of what that doctrine might look like should Oregon courts 
decide to adopt filed rate—that is, that it will not adopt the doctrine 
nearly as rigidly as it is applied elsewhere.135 This section begins by 
discussing the insurance regulatory scheme in Oregon before moving on 
to examining Oregon’s consideration of the filed rate doctrine. The 
section concludes by hypothesizing what the filed rate doctrine might 
look like in Oregon if the state decides to adopt it. 
1. The Oregon Insurance Regulatory Framework 
Insurers in Oregon are required to file their rates, rating plans, and 
rating systems with the Director of the Department of Consumer and 
Business Services (DCBS).136 The Director determines whether the 
rates, rating plans, or rating systems comply with Oregon’s insurance 
                                                     
133. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
134. Dreyer v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 142 P.3d 1010, 1014 n.10 (Or. 2006). 
135. See infra section III.B.3. 
136. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 737.205 (West 2016). 
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regulations.137 Insurance rates in Oregon “shall not be excessive, 
inadequate or unfairly discriminatory.138 Rates are excessive when they 
are “unreasonably high for the insurance provided[,] and . . . [a] 
reasonable degree of competition does not exist” in that particular 
insurance arena.139 
Health insurance rates are reviewed by the DCBS in much the same 
way that they are reviewed in Washington; that is, the DCBS reviews 
and approves rates only for individuals who do not get insurance through 
an employer and small employers with fifty or fewer employees.140 The 
DCBS does not review rates for large groups (with more than fifty 
employees), as those “groups negotiate prices with the insurer.”141 
2. Oregon Has Refused to Adopt the Filed Rate Doctrine 
Oregon courts, though noting that the doctrine exists, have avoided 
the question of whether filed rate is applicable under Oregon law.142 But 
the reasoning of some related Oregon cases suggests that if Oregon 
courts were to adopt filed rate, they would not apply a strict version of 
the doctrine. 
In Dreyer v. Portland General Electric Co.,143 the Oregon Supreme 
Court avoided the question of whether the filed rate doctrine applied in 
Oregon to bar the plaintiffs’ claims.144 In Dreyer, plaintiffs in 
consolidated class actions brought a claim against defendant Portland 
General Electric (PGE) alleging that PGE had wrongfully charged its 
customers for the undepreciated value of one of its former—and now 
closed—power plants.145 Plaintiffs sought a refund “of all amounts that 
ratepayers unlawfully had to pay” during the period PGE charged for the 
                                                     
137. Id. § 737.045 (Westlaw). 
138. Id. § 737.310(1) (Westlaw). 
139. Id. § 737.310(2)(a) (Westlaw).  
140. DEP’T OF CONSUMER & BUS. SERVS., CONSUMER GUIDE TO HEALTH INSURANCE RATE 
REVIEW IN OREGON 6 (2015), http://dfr.oregon.gov/healthrates/Documents/4961.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/R9CQ-3NWX] [hereinafter RATE REVIEW IN OREGON].  
141. Id.; see also id. at 7 (for large group insurance plans (fifty or more employees), “[e]mployers 
negotiate rates directly with the insurance company; these plans’ rates are not subject to state 
regulation”). 
142. See Dreyer v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 142 P.3d 1010, 1014 n.10 (Or. 2006). 
143. 142 P.3d 1010 (Or. 2006). 
144. Id. at 1014 n.10; see also Bates v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 
1350 (D. Or. 2014) (noting that no Oregon court has ever decided whether the filed rate doctrine 
applies in Oregon). 
145. Dreyer, 142 P.3d at 1011. 
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plant.146 After a complicated procedural history involving multiple suits 
and the Oregon Public Utility Commission (PUC), PGE petitioned the 
Oregon Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus ordering the county 
circuit court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ actions and vacate the order 
granting class certification.147 
Though the Oregon Supreme Court said that it would not decide 
whether the filed rate doctrine applied in light of section 757.225 of the 
Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) (requiring utilities to charge only their 
filed rates),148 it did express some uncertainty as to whether the filed rate 
doctrine would bar plaintiffs’ claims for damages even if the doctrine 
were applicable in Oregon.149 The Court noted that it “share[d] 
plaintiffs’ skepticism of the proposition that is at the heart of PGE’s 
argument—that ORS 757.225 manifests a legislative intent that PUC-
approved rates be treated as conclusively lawful for all purposes ‘until 
they are changed as provided in ORS 757.210 to 757.220.’”150 Rather, 
the Court reasoned, “The statute is not aimed, as PGE suggests, at 
conclusively and permanently binding the entire world to the rate 
decisions of the PUC.”151 
In a related later case involving the same allegedly unlawful PGE 
rates, the Oregon Court of Appeals interpreted two statutes—one 
addressing the inclusion of undepreciated investments in rates152 and one 
addressing the exclusion of certain costs from rates153—to determine 
whether PGE was permitted to charge its customers for the 
undepreciated value of its closed plant.154 The court of appeals 
determined that the PUC had erred in permitting PGE to charge its 
customers for more than the principal amount of its “undepreciated 
investment” in the closed power plant.155 The court reversed the 
consolidated cases and remanded with instructions for the PUC to 
reconsider its rates.156 
                                                     
146. Id. at 1016. 
147. Id. at 1011.  
148. Id. at 1014 n.10. 
149. Id. at 1018–19. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 1019.  
152. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 757.140(2) (West 2016). 
153. Id. § 757.355 (Westlaw). 
154. Citizens’ Util. Bd. v. PUC, 962 P.2d 744, 746–47 (Or. App. 1998). 
155. Id. at 750. 
156. Id. at 752.  
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On reconsideration, the PUC “clarified its understanding of [the 
Oregon Supreme Court’s] decision in Dreyer, particularly noting that 
[the Oregon Supreme Court] had not determined the scope of the filed 
rate doctrine or its impact on the PUC’s remedial authority.”157 
Accordingly, the PUC “concluded that it had remedial authority [to 
order issue of a refund] . . . . The PUC [thus] ordered PGE to issue a 
refund to the post-2000 ratepayers” to compensate them for the 
difference between what they paid following a settlement in a related 
case and the rates they would have paid if PGE had filed rates without 
the unlawful inclusion of some of its power plant losses.158 
In Gearhart v. Public Utility Commission of Oregon,159 customers in 
a class action and the Utility Reform Project challenged the PUC’s 
reexamination of previously authorized rates to determine whether 
PGE’s customers had suffered injury, arguing that the court should adopt 
“a rule against retroactive ratemaking.”160 The Court declined to hold 
that the rule against retroactive ratemaking applied in Oregon under all 
circumstances, but decided that: 
It is sufficient for present purposes to conclude, as we do, that 
the rule against retroactive ratemaking does not preclude the 
action that the PUC took on remand in this case. The PUC did 
not alter PGE’s rates retroactively, but rather used ratemaking 
principles to calculate the rates that it would have authorized 
PGE to charge had it not included a return on the investment in 
[the closed plant].161  
In coming to that decision, the Court noted that it was important that 
it had not accepted the “extreme” version of the filed rate doctrine that 
PGE had urged in Dreyer.162 Rather, it emphasized that in Dreyer, “the 
[C]ourt rejected the notion that PGE was shielded from liability because 
it was required by ORS 757.225 to charge the rates that were later held 
                                                     
157. Gearhart v. Public Util. Comm’n of Or., 339 P.3d 904, 911 (Or. 2014). 
158. Id. at 913. 
159. 339 P.3d 904 (Or. 2014). 
160. Id. at 917. The rule against retroactive ratemaking is a related doctrine to filed rate, but has 
important differences. See Stefan H. Krieger, The Ghost of Regulation Past: Current Applications of 
the Rule Against Retroactive Ratemaking in Public Utility Proceedings, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 983, 
986 n.8 (1991) (“Closely related to, but distinct from, the rule against retroactive ratemaking is the 
‘filed rate doctrine.’ That doctrine forbids a utility from charging rates other than those properly 
filed with the commission. Although courts have relied on the filed rate doctrine as one of the bases 
for the retroactivity rule, this doctrine is in fact a limitation on the power of utilities, not 
commissions.” (citations omitted)).  
161. Gearhart, 339 P.3d at 917. 
162. Id. at 918. 
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to improperly include a return on the investment in” the closed plant.163 
Accordingly, the Court concluded in Gearhart: 
Thus, unlike some courts, this [C]ourt has not read ORS 757.225 
as a manifestation of legislative intent to allow retroactive relief 
only when a utility collects rates different from those approved 
by the PUC . . . . Dreyer instead suggests that a utility that 
collects rates approved by the PUC may have to return a portion 
of those rates if they are later found to be invalid on judicial 
review.164 
Courts in other Oregon cases have been similarly unwilling to apply 
the filed rate doctrine to bar a plaintiff’s claims.165 
3. Oregon Has Implicitly Rejected a Traditional Application of the 
Filed Rate Doctrine 
Though Oregon courts have not adopted the filed rate doctrine in that 
state, Oregon has evinced a willingness to permit challenges to approved 
rates,166 to allow courts to remand orders to the regulating agency where 
the approved rate included an unlawful charge,167 and to permit the 
regulating agency to issue refunds for rates unlawfully charged.168 
Indeed, in its proclamation that the statute requiring utilities to charge 
the filed rate “is not aimed . . . at conclusively and permanently binding 
the entire world to the rate decisions of the PUC[,]”169 the Oregon 
Supreme Court seems to suggest that—unlike courts that will permit no 
variation between the approved rate and the customer’s out-of-pocket 
payment to the company—approval by a regulating agency does not 
insulate the company’s rates from challenge or refund. 
                                                     
163. Id. 
164. Id. (emphasis added). See also Gearhart v. Public Util. Comm’n of Or., 299 P.3d 533, 545 
(Or. App. 2013) (in interpreting the Dreyer decision, the court of appeals noted that the filed rate 
statute “in and of itself does not absolutely shield a utility from having to return any part of its rates 
that later is adjudged to be unlawful”). 
165. See, e.g., Bates v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 993 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1350 (D. Or. 2014) 
(“Assuming arguendo that Oregon has adopted or would adopt the filed-rate doctrine under 
appropriate circumstances, it is inapposite here. Plaintiffs state expressly that their claims are not 
premised on any challenge to Bankers’ authority to raise its premium rates or to the validity of the 
rates that they have been charged . . . .” (emphasis added in final clause)); Adamson v. WorldCom 
Comms., Inc., 78 P.3d 577, 582 (Or. App. 2003) (holding that where a tariff is filed, the terms of the 
tariff control except where the claim is unrelated to the tariff; “[i]n other words, merely because a 
tariff exists does not necessarily mean a claim is barred”). 
166. See Dreyer v. Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 142 P.3d 1010, 1018–19 (Or. 2006). 
167. See Citizens’ Util. Bd. v. PUC, 962 P.2d 744, 752 (Or. App. 1998). 
168. See Gearhart, 339 P.3d at 918–19. 
169. Dreyer, 142 P.3d at 1019. 
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Accordingly, Oregon courts are unlikely to use the filed rate doctrine 
to bar at the outset a request for damages based on premiums paid to an 
insurance company whose rates are filed in Oregon. And, if the Oregon 
courts were to adopt the filed rate doctrine, that doctrine would almost 
certainly look very different than it appears elsewhere, as Oregon courts 
have already effectuated the kind of “rebates” that some courts applying 
filed rate appear to avoid. 
C. California Application of the Filed Rate Doctrine is Inconsistent 
California, unlike Washington and Oregon, has embodied its filed rate 
doctrine in the insurance arena in statute for most kinds of insurance.170 
California’s statutory filed rate doctrine, however, does not apply to 
health insurance.171 For that reason, California courts expressly disagree 
with each other about whether the common law filed rate doctrine 
applies to other California insurance—and, indeed, they disagree about 
whether it applies in other contexts as well.172 This section proceeds in 
four segments. It begins by discussing the health insurance regulatory 
framework in California. It then moves on to describing the insurance 
regulatory scheme in that state, noting how California’s version of the 
filed rate doctrine (for insurance other than health insurance) is 
embodied in statute. But despite the statutory nature of California’s filed 
rate doctrine for insurance other than health insurance, courts still 
disagree about whether that statutory scheme—like common law filed 
rate in some jurisdictions—bars suits related to agency-approved rates. 
The section then considers the filed rate doctrine in the utility context 
before concluding with an analysis of the likely future application of the 
filed rate doctrine in California. 
1. The California Health Insurance Regulatory Framework 
In California, health insurers are required to file rate information for 
individual and small group health insurance policies before 
implementing a rate change.173 Health insurers are required to file rate 
change information for large group health insurance policies only when 
the change amounts to an “unreasonable rate” increase.174 
                                                     
170. See CAL. INS. CODE § 1860.1 (West 2016). 
171. Id. § 1851 (Westlaw). 
172. See infra sections III.C.2–3. 
173. CAL. INS. CODE. § 10181.3(a) (West 2017). 
174. Id. § 10181.4(a) (Westlaw). 
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“‘Unreasonable rate increase’ has the same meaning as that term is 
defined in the [Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act].”175 The rate 
filing must be accompanied by an actuarial certification of the rate’s 
reasonableness or unreasonableness.176 If the rate is unreasonable, that 
rate must also include a justification for the increase.177 All of the rate 
filing information submitted under these laws must be made publicly 
available by the California Department of Insurance with the exception 
of the contracted rates between health insurers and providers/large 
groups.178 
The Department of Insurance reviews the filings, posts the rate 
increase information on its websites and permits public comment on the 
postings, and reports to the Legislature on unreasonable rate filings.179 
Furthermore, if the Insurance Commissioner determines that a rate 
increase is unreasonable or unjustified, or that a rate filing contains 
inaccurate information, the Department posts that decision on its 
website,180 and the health insurer is required to “provide notice of that 
determination to any individual or small group applicant.”181 However, 
“[w]hile the Commissioner can request that the insurer amend the rate 
change or make an official determination that the proposed rate change 
is unreasonable, the Commissioner does not have the authority to deny 
or approve proposed rate changes.”182 
Thus, unlike its counterparts in Washington and Oregon, the 
California Department of Insurance is not empowered to disapprove 
health insurance rates. For that reason, it seems unlikely that the filed 
rate doctrine would ever apply (at least under the current statutory 
scheme) to claims against health insurers in California. The following 
sections, however, attempt to discern what that doctrine might look like 
if it were to apply to health insurance by detailing how the doctrine has 
applied in other regulatory contexts in California. 
                                                     
175. Id. § 10181 (Westlaw). 
176. Id. § 10181.6 (Westlaw). 
177. Id. § 10181.6(b) (Westlaw). 
178. Id. § 10181.7 (Westlaw). 
179. Id. § 10181.11 (Westlaw). 
180. Id. § 10181.11(f) (Westlaw). 
181. Id. § 10181.3(g) (Westlaw). 
182. Rate Fillings and Review, CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF INSURANCE, http://www.insurance.ca.gov/ 
01-consumers/110-health/70-rates/ [https://perma.cc/4CAP-39G4]. Some courts have argued that 
the mere review of filed rates, rather than their application, is enough to trigger the filed rate 
doctrine. See infra Part IV.B. The Ninth Circuit, however, has rejected this argument. See Wileman 
Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Giannini, 909 F.2d 332, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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2. Application of the Filed Rate Doctrine to Insurance Other than 
Health Insurance Is Uneven Because It Requires Statutory 
Interpretation 
Unlike courts in Washington and Oregon, courts in California have 
determined that the filed rate doctrine in California is, at least for some 
insurance, embodied in statute.183 Following a voter initiative passed in 
1988, certain insurers184 are required to file a rate application with the 
Insurance Commissioner and receive the Commissioner’s approval 
before changing any insurance rates.185 “Once the commissioner’s 
decision is final, an insurer must charge only the approved rate . . . . A 
consumer, however, may petition the commissioner to review the 
continued use of any rate.”186 Accordingly, application of the filed rate 
doctrine to insurance cases (besides health insurance) in California often 
depends on an interpretation of the Insurance Code.187 However, 
“California Courts of Appeal have disagreed over whether California 
recognizes [the filed rate] doctrine to preclude challenges to rates filed 
pursuant to the Insurance Code”188—that is, California courts disagree 
about whether this statutory scheme acts (as the common law filed rate 
doctrine does in other jurisdictions) as a bar to lawsuits related to 
                                                     
183. CAL. INS. CODE § 1860.1 (West 2016); see also King v. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co., 129 F. Supp. 3d 
925, 933 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“While Defendants’ argument invokes the ‘filed rate doctrine,’ a 
judicially-created doctrine that prohibits lawsuits challenging rates approved by a regulatory 
agency, California’s statutory scheme explicitly embodies an analogous prohibition in Section 
1860.1 of the California Insurance Code. . . . The filed rate doctrine is relevant, if at all, because it 
supports courts’ interpretations of the statutes.”). 
184. This provision does not apply to health insurance. Pursuant to section 1851 of the California 
Insurance Code, “[t]he provisions of this chapter shall apply to all insurance on risks or on 
operations in this state, except: . . . (e) [d]isability insurance.” “Disability insurance” under this 
statutory scheme includes health insurance. “Disability insurance includes insurance appertaining to 
injury, disablement or death resulting to the insured from accidents, and appertaining to 
disablements resulting to the insured from sickness.” CAL. INS. CODE § 106(a) (West 2016). “In 
statutes that become effective on or after January 1, 2002, the term ‘health insurance’ for purposes 
of this code shall mean an individual or group disability insurance policy that provides coverage for 
hospital, medical, or surgical benefits.” Id. § 106(b) (Westlaw).  
185. Fogel v. Farmers Grp., Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).  
186. Walker v. Allstate Indem. Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132, 134 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (internal 
citation omitted). 
187. See, e.g., MacKay v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893, 905–06 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) 
(interpreting how sections 1860.1, 1860.2, and 1861.03 work together to preclude claims that 
attempt to challenge insurance rates); Fogel, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 72–73 (whether plaintiffs’ claims were 
barred depended on whether the action complained of fell within the scope of section 1860.1). 
188. Leghorn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 950 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citing 
Fogel, 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 74–75; Walker, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 137 n.4; MacKay, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
910). 
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agency-approved rates that arise within the Insurance Code itself. Where 
California courts do use the filed rate doctrine in these cases, “the filed 
rate doctrine provides that rates duly adopted by a regulatory agency are 
not subject to collateral attack in court.”189 
The lower California courts expressly disagree with each other about 
whether filed rate applies to California insurance cases other than health 
insurance.190 On one side of the divide, many California courts 
interpreting and applying the doctrine have determined that the statute 
applies to bar most claims; at least two cases have held that plaintiffs 
may not challenge an approved rate under a law that is outside the 
Insurance Code.191 In MacKay v. Superior Court,192 the plaintiffs had 
challenged the defendant insurance company’s method of determining 
whether an insured was a “Good Driver” for the purposes of California 
law permitting a rate reduction. The court held that the statute barred the 
plaintiffs’ claims.193 And in Walker v. Allstate Indemnity Co.,194 the 
court similarly ruled that the plaintiffs’ claim that they were charged too 
much for insurance and were entitled to a refund was barred by the 
statute.195 
On the other side of the divide, the court in Fogel v. Farmers Group, 
Inc.196 determined that a “key distinction” between the filed rate doctrine 
and California’s “‘prior approval’ system governing insurance rates”—
the ability of the insurer to issue a rebate—meant that the plaintiff was 
not barred from bringing his claim.197 The distinction was simple: under 
the federal system, once rates are filed a carrier cannot give rebates to its 
customers and a customer is barred from bringing a lawsuit that would, 
if damages were awarded, have the effect of a rebate; the California 
statutory scheme, on the other hand, permits an insurer to rebate 
excessive premiums to its customers.198 Thus, the court determined, 
“even if the filed rate doctrine applied in the context of a rate approved 
                                                     
189. Leghorn, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (quoting MacKay, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 910) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
190. MacKay, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 910. (“We thus must disagree with Fogel v. Farmers Grp., 
Inc. to the extent that it rejected the application of the filed rate doctrine to California insurances 
rates.” (internal citation omitted)).  
191. Id.; Walker, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 136. 
192. 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010). 
193. Id. at 896. 
194. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).  
195. Id. at 136. 
196. 74 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
197. Id. at 74–75. 
198. Id. at 74–75. 
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by a state regulatory agency (defendants have pointed to no cases in 
which it was), it nevertheless would have no application here.”199 
California federal courts applying California law have also been 
unwilling to find that plaintiffs’ claims against insurers are precluded 
under filed rate where the plaintiffs do not challenge the rates 
themselves.200 Those decisions appear to be split, however, on whether 
the measure of damages might implicate the filed rate doctrine. 
Ellsworth v. U.S. Bank,201 for example, reasoned that “[j]ust because the 
damages are based on increased costs incurred as a result of [an] alleged 
kickback scheme does not transform a challenge to conduct and 
practices into a challenge to the premiums.”202 The court in Leghorn v. 
Wells Fargo Bank,203 however, noted that although the filed rate doctrine 
did not preclude plaintiffs’ claims that their banks were improperly 
receiving kickbacks from an insurance company, the filed rate doctrine 
could have barred the plaintiffs’ claims if the “[c]omplaint [was] 
construed as setting forth the theory that Plaintiffs were harmed by 
payment of [the insurance company’s] premiums because those 
premiums were improperly inflated by the commissions it paid to [the 
bank].”204 
3. Application of the Filed Rate Doctrine to Utilities Is Similarly 
Contradictory 
Some California courts applying the filed rate doctrine in the 
telecommunications context have found that damages claims requesting 
a rebate of rates paid are barred by the doctrine.205 The courts—like 
most others applying filed rate—reason that permitting a refund of rates 
would, in effect, permit the plaintiff to receive services at a discounted 
rate in violation of the non-discrimination strand of filed rate.206 
                                                     
199. Id. at 75. 
200. Leghorn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 950 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2013); 
Ellsworth v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 908 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
201. 908 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
202. Id. at 1083. 
203. 950 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
204. Id. at 1115. 
205. See, e.g., Gallivan v. AT&T Corp., 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 898 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Day v. AT&T 
Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
206. Gallivan, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 905; Day, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 63 (“[Plaintiffs] may not seek to 
recover any money from respondents, whether they label their request one for disgorgement or 
otherwise. The net effect of imposing any monetary sanction on the respondents will be to 
effectuate a rebate, thereby resulting in discriminatory rates.”). 
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Not all California courts agree with this analysis, however. The court 
in Cellular Plus, Inc. v. Superior Court207 determined that the filed rate 
doctrine did not prevent the plaintiffs from bringing an antitrust claim 
against cellular providers charging the defendants with price fixing, even 
though the rates had been approved by the California Public Utilities 
Commission (PUC). In that case, the plaintiffs—individual consumers 
and corporate sales agents—brought suit against cellular phone service 
providers in San Diego County.208 The trial court had granted the 
defendants demurrer as to two of the plaintiffs’ causes of action alleging 
wholesale and retail price fixing of cell phone service rates in the 
County,209 reasoning that the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims were either 
precluded or that the plaintiffs needed to bring them to the PUC in the 
first instance because the cellular providers’ rates had been approved by 
the PUC.210 The court of appeals disagreed, rejecting the argument that 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Keogh applied in California to 
antitrust cases.211 Rather, the court found that “[n]either the Cartwright 
Act nor the Public Utilities Code contains any provision exempting 
cellular telephone service providers from the prohibitions of the 
Cartwright Act.”212 The court found it significant that the filed rate 
doctrine, if used in this way, could actually incentivize illicit activity 
because removing the threat of treble damages under the Cartwright Act 
might encourage companies to engage in anticompetitive price fixing.213 
4. The Future Application of the Filed Rate Doctrine in California Is 
Unsettled 
Because California health insurance rates are not “approved” by the 
Department of Insurance (in that health insurers are not required to get 
authorization of their rates prior to charging customers), it is unlikely 
that the filed rate doctrine would apply to health insurers required to file 
in California.214 Indeed, one of the stated purposes for the filed rate 
doctrine—to preserve the agency’s primary jurisdiction to determine the 
                                                     
207. 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
208. Id. at 310. 
209. Id. at 311. 
210. Id. at 310. 
211. Id. at 318–19. 
212. Id. at 319.  
213. Id. 
214. Some courts argue that the filed rate should apply in just these circumstances. See infra 
section IV.B. 
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reasonableness of rates—would make little sense in California, where 
the agency does not have primary jurisdiction to dictate reasonable rates. 
However, health insurers in California are still permitted to charge 
only the rates they have on file with the Department of Insurance unless 
and until they file to change those rates. To the extent, then, that a court 
may invoke the filed rate doctrine to rates filed with—but not approved 
by—the state Department of Insurance, it seems likely that courts would 
draw on the filed rate doctrine as it is applied to utilities (currently 
analyzed under a common law version of the filed rate doctrine) and 
insurance other than health insurance (analyzed under the California 
Insurance Code’s statutory scheme). Unfortunately, California courts 
directly contradict each other on whether and how the filed rate doctrine 
applies in California under both of these versions of filed rate. Clarity on 
the filed rate doctrine in California would require either a California 
Supreme Court case on the topic or for the lower courts to begin 
overruling their prior (contradictory) cases. 
IV. IN WASHINGTON, THE FILED RATE DOCTRINE SHOULD 
NOT APPLY TO CLAIMS OF WRONGFUL CONDUCT THAT 
ARE INDEPENDENT OF RATES 
The filed rate doctrine should apply to claims that allege unreasonable 
rates, but it should not apply to other claims that, if successful, might 
result in a rebate of those rates. There is a difference between, on the one 
hand, claims that assert that the rates approved by a regulating agency 
are artificially high because of some wrongful conduct committed by the 
defendant and, on the other hand, claims that the defendant committed 
some wrongful conduct that entitles the plaintiffs to a return of some of 
the rate paid. The former alleges that the plaintiffs should have received 
the same services for lower rates; the latter alleges that the plaintiffs 
would have been satisfied to pay the rate approved by the OIC if they 
had received the services promised, but that the defendant either 
breached a contract or committed some other violation of the law 
(usually in the WCPA arena).215 The former claim should be barred by 
the filed rate doctrine; the latter should not. What is needed, therefore, is 
                                                     
215. See, e.g., Beller v. William Penn Life Ins. Co., 778 N.Y.S.2d 82, 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) 
(where plaintiff brought claims for breach of contract based on the defendant insurance company’s 
alleged failure to lower her premiums as required by their contract, the filed rate doctrine did not 
apply because the plaintiff did not “challenge the reasonableness of the maximum rates set forth in 
the policy, nor [did] she claim that she should have been treated differently from any other 
subscriber”). 
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a “nuanced approach” that seeks to “consider[] the specifics of the claim 
and the policy basis for the filed rate doctrine.”216 
A. Application of the Filed Rate Doctrine to Cases Involving Breach 
of Contract or WCPA Claims Is Contrary to the Doctrine’s 
Purposes 
Where plaintiffs allege only that the agency-approved rates that they 
paid were artificially high because of some wrongful conduct by the 
defendant, it makes sense to apply the filed rate doctrine. A good 
illustration of a case asserting artificially high rates is the recent 
Washington case of McCarthy Finance, Inc. v. Premera. As noted in 
section III.A.2, the plaintiffs in McCarthy alleged that their insurance 
provider and the Washington Alliance for Healthcare Insurance Trust 
(WAHIT) had “colluded and made false and misleading representations 
to the plaintiffs that induced the plaintiffs to purchase health insurance 
policies under false pretenses” in violation of the WCPA.217 As a result 
of the defendants’ alleged “violations of the [WCPA, the plaintiffs] 
experienced excessive, unnecessary, unfair and deceptive overcharges 
for health insurance, resulting in Premera obtaining profits of millions of 
dollars that helped enable Premera to amass a surplus of approximately 
$1 billion.”218 The plaintiffs sought to recover (1) a refund in their 
premiums in the amount that they allegedly overpaid, and (2) a refund of 
the surplus that the insurance company had allegedly amassed as a result 
of the wrongful rates.219 The Washington State Supreme Court rejected 
the plaintiffs’ claims under the filed rate doctrine because the plaintiffs 
could not find some measure of damages that did not directly attack the 
amount prescribed by rates they had paid.220 In essence, the McCarthy 
plaintiffs were asserting that, for the services they received, their rates 
were too high. In a case like this, where the rates and the underlying 
services are evaluated by the OIC,221 it makes sense for a court to refuse 
to reevaluate a decision left by the Legislature to the agency’s discretion. 
A very different case is presented by a class of plaintiffs that is 
perfectly happy to pay the rate set by the OIC provided that the 
                                                     
216. McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, 182 Wash. App. 1, 14, 328 P.3d 940, 947 (2014), rev’d 182 
Wash. 2d 936, 944, 347 P.3d 872, 876 (2015). 
217. 182 Wash. 2d 936, 939, 347 P.3d 872, 873–74 (2015). 
218. Id. at 940, 347 P.3d at 874 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
219. Id.  
220. Id. at 943, 347 P.3d at 875–76. 
221. Provided that they are, in fact, evaluated—see infra section IV.B.  
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regulated entity lives up to its contractual and legal obligations under 
that rate schedule. In this type of case, plaintiffs do not allege that their 
rates are too high; rather, they allege that they either did not receive the 
services that they were promised (say, if their utility refused to maintain 
its equipment on their property, as it was obligated to under their 
contract222) or that their company committed some sort of consumer 
protection violation not involving the filed rate (say, if an insurance 
company failed to disclose a data breach, giving insureds less time to 
monitor and protect their personal information223). In those cases, the 
two reasons underlying the filed rate doctrine do not apply. 
First, prevention of rate discrimination is inapplicable in cases 
involving a breach of contract or injury caused by an insurer’s tort. As 
the Supreme Court noted in Keogh—the case establishing filed rate—the 
purpose behind non-discrimination is not to ensure that everyone pays 
the same amount for the sake of simplicity; rather, non-discrimination 
exists to prevent a private plaintiff from getting a “rebate” in damages 
that might “operate to give him a preference over his trade 
competitors.”224 But in cases involving breach of contract, the measure 
of damages is the amount of money it would take to give the plaintiff the 
benefit of the bargain he already struck with the service provider—not 
an amount that is intended to give him some advantage over trade 
competitors.225 This is particularly significant in cases where other 
customers have not experienced the same breach of contract. In such a 
case, a court refusing to award damages on the basis of filed rate 
effectuates discriminatory rates: it forces the breached plaintiff to bear 
the costs of the defendants’ wrongful conduct while permitting other 
plaintiffs to enjoy the benefit of the same rates without the cost of 
breach. This reasoning applies with equal force to cases sounding in tort, 
where the plaintiff’s measure of damages is not an amount of money that 
would give him an unfair advantage over his competitors, but an amount 
                                                     
222. See Hoffman v. Northern States Power Co., 764 N.W.2d 34, 38 (Minn. 2009). 
223. See In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litigation, No. 15-MD-02617-LHK, 2016 WL 3029783, 
at *1–3 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016). 
224. Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 163 (1922) (emphasis added). 
225. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (West 2016) (the measure of damages 
“in general” in a contract action is “damages based on [the party’s] expectation interest, as 
measured by (a) the loss in value to him of the other party’s performance caused by its failure or 
deficiency, (b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, less 
(c) any other cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to perform”).  
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that would make him whole for a defendant’s breach of duty.226 
Refusing to make a plaintiff whole on the basis of the filed rate doctrine, 
therefore, discriminates in favor of other customers who have not 
experienced the same injury and who therefore pay the agency-approved 
rate without suffering the same costs.227 
Second, the non-justiciability strand of the filed rate doctrine is 
chiefly intended to prevent judicial interference in “a function that 
Congress [or the legislature] has assigned to a . . . regulatory body.”228 
But where the legislative body at issue has directly permitted the lawsuit 
that the insurer would seek to prevent under the filed rate doctrine, 
application of the doctrine no longer makes sense. In Washington, an 
insured is expressly permitted to bring a WCPA claim against an 
insurer—including a claim based on misrepresentations that are 
prohibited in the Insurance Code.229 As the court of appeals noted in 
McCarthy, “[t]he rigid filed rate standard Premera propose[d] would 
significantly undercut these provisions.”230 The Washington Supreme 
Court has further emphasized that “while a court must be cautious not to 
substitute its judgment on proper rate setting for that of the relevant 
agency, the legislature has directed that the [WCPA] be liberally 
construed.”231 To say, then, that the application of the filed rate doctrine 
in WCPA cases serves the legislature’s purpose in delegating ratemaking 
decisions to the agency ignores the legislature’s purpose in specifically 
permitting that very cause of action. The Washington Supreme Court 
recognized as much in McCarthy, though the Court in that case was 
faced with an excessive premiums claim masquerading as a WCPA 
claim: 
In most cases, courts must consider [WCPA] claims even when 
the requested damages are related to agency-approved rates 
                                                     
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (West 2016) (defining “compensatory 
damages” in tort as “the damages awarded to a person as compensation, indemnity or restitution for 
harm sustained by him”). 
227. Class actions, moreover, have the potential to effect the same rebate for all customers—
thereby eliminating the risk of discrimination among ratepayers. Although the United States 
Supreme Court considered this argument insufficient to nullify the filed rate doctrine in Square D 
Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 423 (1986), there is no reason that state courts 
(including Washington) should not consider this argument in deciding how state versions of the 
doctrine might apply.  
228. Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 582 (1981). 
229. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.170 (2016); McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. Premera, 182 Wash. App. 1, 
13, 328 P.3d 940, 946 (2014), rev’d 182 Wash. 2d 936, 944, 347 P.3d 872, 876 (2015). 
230. McCarthy, 182 Wash. App. at 13, 328 P.3d at 946–47. 
231. McCarthy, 182 Wash. 2d at 942, 347 P.3d at 875 (2015). 
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because, to the extent that claimants can prove damages without 
attacking agency-approved rates, the benefits gained from 
courts’ considering [WCPA] claims outweigh any benefit that 
would be derived from applying the filed rate doctrine to bar the 
claims.232 
Washington courts have spent many years now measuring damages in 
the WCPA context233—there is no reason to believe that they could not 
do so for claims against health insurers, at least where those claims do 
not allege that the premiums are artificially high. 
B. The Potential Application of the Filed Rate Doctrine in Class 
Actions Further Demonstrates the Hazards of Applying the 
Doctrine to Cases Only Tangentially Involving Rates 
Because of the potential for unnecessary and unfair disparate 
treatment, cases of particular concern are class actions involving the 
same allegedly wrongful conduct—say, a data breach exposing 
customers’ private information to hackers—where some class plaintiffs 
are subject to the filed rate doctrine and others are not. In Washington, 
the OIC does not affirmatively approve health insurance rates for large 
group insurance policies (51 or more employees). Rather, the OIC 
collects only rating models from large group policies, allowing the 
insurance companies to directly negotiate rates with the large group 
insureds.234 The OIC affirmatively approves rates only for small group 
and individual policy filings.235 
This distinction is significant. The Ninth Circuit has held that “failure 
to disapprove,” even where an agency is empowered to make such a 
disapproval, does not trigger application of the federal filed rate 
                                                     
232. Id. at 943, 347 P.3d at 875. 
233. See, e.g., Panag v. Farmers Ins. Co., 166 Wash. 2d 27, 62–63, 204 P.3d 885, 902 (2009) 
(collecting cases related to the different ways that Washington courts have measured damages for 
WCPA claims).  
234. FAQ About Health Insurance Rates, supra note 92 (under “How we review rates”) (“We 
also review the policies for large employer health plans (51+ employees), but most employers can 
negotiate the rates with their insurance company.”); Premera, Premera Blue Cross, and Lifewise 
Health Plan of Washington’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 1–2, McCarthy Fin., Inc. v. 
Premera, No. 122015708, 2013 WL 9008317 (Wash. Super. Jan. 4, 2013), 2012 WL 11386547, at 
*1 (“One important difference between large group and small group or individual rates is that the 
large group rates are customized for each group after individualized negotiations between Premera 
and each individual group.”).  
235. The plaintiffs in McCarthy for some reason chose not to argue the significance of this 
distinction in the Washington State Supreme Court, instead deciding “not [to] challenge that the 
OIC approved the health insurance premiums that the Policyholders paid.” McCarthy, 182 Wash. 2d 
at 942, 374 P.3d at 874. 
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doctrine.236 In Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc. v. Giannini,237 the Ninth 
Circuit considered whether the filed rate doctrine barred allegedly unfair 
marketing standards that the defendants had promulgated without 
authorization from the Secretary of Agriculture.238 The defendants 
argued that the Secretary’s failure to disapprove the standards, in light of 
statutory provisions that would have permitted such an action, prevented 
the plaintiff’s action under the filed rate doctrine;239 the court rejected 
that argument, reasoning that: 
The mere failure to disapprove . . . does not legitimize otherwise 
anticompetitive conduct. First, nondisapproval requires neither 
publication and comment nor explicit findings. In fact, it does 
not guarantee any level of review whatsoever . . . . Second, non-
disapproval is equally consistent with lack of knowledge or 
neglect as it is with assent.240 
The Ninth Circuit upheld Wileman in Brown v. Ticor Title Insurance 
Co.241 and took the argument a step further—in Brown, the defendant 
title insurance company actually filed its rates with state regulatory 
agencies,242 and it was only permitted to charge the rates that it filed.243 
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that its rates were lawful 
because they had not been disapproved by the relevant regulatory 
agencies, reasoning instead that if the defendant’s “rates were the 
product of unlawful activity prior to their being filed and were not 
subjected to meaningful review by the state, then the fact that they were 
filed does not render them immune from challenge.”244 In the absence of 
meaningful state review, the court went on, insurers are permitted “to 
                                                     
236. Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 393–94 (9th Cir. 1992); Wileman Bros. & 
Elliott, Inc. v. Giannini, 909 F.2d 332, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1990); cf. Town of Norwood v. New 
England Power Co., 202 F.3d 408, 419 (1st Cir. 2000) (“It is the filing of the tariffs, and not any 
affirmative approval or scrutiny by the agency, that triggers the filed rate doctrine.”). 
237. 909 F.2d 332 (9th Cir. 1990). 
238. Id. at 333. 
239. Id. at 337. 
240. Id. at 337–38.  
241. 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1992).  
242. Though the Ninth Circuit in Brown dealt with rates filed with Arizona and Wisconsin 
regulatory agencies, it did not appear to consider or apply Arizona or Wisconsin state versions of 
the filed rate doctrine (if they exist, which is beyond the scope of this Comment). Id. at 393–94. 
Rather, the court continually referred to the filed rate doctrine as the “Keogh doctrine,” an apparent 
call out to federal filed rate under Keogh v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922). Id.  
243. Brown, 982 F.2d at 393–94.  
244. Id. at 394. 
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file any rates they want,” and so “the act of filing does not legitimize a 
rate arrived at by improper action.”245 
If a Washington court were to rigidly apply the filed rate doctrine, 
then—applying it only to claims that are actually approved by the 
agency—the claims of class plaintiffs who were not part of a large group 
insurance policy would likely be barred, while the claims of their large 
group co-plaintiffs would likely not be. In such a case, the twin aims of 
the filed rate doctrine are undone. 
First, rate discrimination would ensue: large group insureds would be 
permitted to receive a refund of premiums paid as a measure of 
damages, and would therefore in total paying less than their non-large 
group counterparts. This is a particularly troublesome possibility 
because where agencies do not approve rates for large groups, it is often 
because it is assumed that large-group policyholders are in a better 
position to bargain for lower rates.246 If a Washington court were to 
rigidly apply the filed rate doctrine in a mixed class case like this, it 
would, in effect, further ensure that small group and individual policy 
holders were put in worse bargaining positions and forced to pay higher 
premiums. This seems particularly harsh in light of the fact that the 
WCPA authorizes suits for “unfair competition and unfair, deceptive and 
fraudulent acts or practices in order to protect the public and foster fair 
and honest competition.”247 Where a court would deny individual and 
small group insureds a WCPA cause of action on the basis of filed rate 
(while permitting the claims of their large group counterparts), it would 
strike a double blow to those who are most likely hurt by the absence of 
“fair and honest competition.” 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the non-justiciability arm of 
the filed rate doctrine would no longer apply: the same court that would 
dismiss small group and individual policyholders on the basis of the 
filed rate doctrine (reasoning that it, as a court, was in no position to 
calculate reasonable rates) would necessarily have to decide reasonable 
rates as a measure of damages for the large group policyholders anyway. 
It makes little sense that a court could dismiss a swath of plaintiffs on 
the basis that it cannot calculate a measure of damages that it is poised to 
calculate for the rest of the class. 
                                                     
245. Id.  
246. See RATE REVIEW IN OREGON, supra note 140, at 6 (“[I]ndividuals and small business 
buyers are considered the most vulnerable consumers because they lack the negotiating power of 
large groups.”). 
247. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.26.920 (2016) (emphasis added).  
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CONCLUSION 
Though Washington has left the door open for WCPA claims, even in 
the context of filed rates, it needs to do more to draw the line between 
cases that challenge the reasonableness of rates charged and cases that 
deal with rates only as a tangential matter. While it might make sense to 
prevent collateral attack of agency-approved rates when a claim is, 
essentially, that the rates are too high, the justifications for the 
doctrine—non-discrimination and non-justiciability—are not applicable 
to cases where plaintiffs allege a breach of contract or a WCPA 
violation. Courts, then, should take care to investigate the gravamen of a 
plaintiff’s claims before dismissing on the basis of filed rate, dismissing 
only where the plaintiff in essence challenges an agency’s approval of 
the rates it must pay. Certainly, this distinction might prove difficult to 
implement; California courts, as explained, seem to be struggling with 
whether and how to distinguish between cases that challenge rates and 
cases that allege some other wrong. But, as is more apparent in Oregon, 
there does not seem to be any irreparable harm in refunding rates to 
customers for wrongs done them by private companies with filed rates. 
Where consumers do not challenge the agency-approved rates 
themselves, then, there seems little reason to continue to apply the filed 
rate doctrine, especially where doing so would undermine the intent of 
the legislature in enacting the WCPA. 
 
